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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the disequilibrium hypothesis
on the Polish loan market in the 1990s. Using data over this period of deep tran-
sition, we estimate a disequilibrium model with a standard maximum likelihood
method. However, the estimates are highly counter-intuitive as regards the timing
of the identiﬁed regimes. We show that the gap between the econometric evidence
and the expected results may stem from the issue of stochastic non-stationarity
in a disequilibrium setting based on the “min” condition. We ﬁnd that the omis-
sion of one non-stationary variable of the cointegrating space or the absence of a
“structural” cointegrating relationship in one or both regimes lead to a spurious
conﬁguration. In such a case, using, wrongly, the standard likelihood function,
derived under the hypothesis of stationarity, may lead to non-convergent estimates
of structural parameters and, as a consequence, to a fallacious regimes identiﬁca-
tion. Therefore, as the ﬁrst approach to this issue, we estimate a disequilibrium
model with stationary data. The empirical results are then robust and economi-
cally founded and correspond to the set and the timing of anticipated regimes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Polish credit market unquestionably experienced sharply contrasting evolutions in
the 1990s. The diﬃculty of the monetary authority’s control over credit activity was a
permanent preoccupation during the Polish transition process, but the corresponding
reasons changed dramatically over time. Between 1995 and 1998, the combination of
ﬁxed exchange rate policies and strong capital inﬂows led to a spectacular accumulation
of foreign reserves by the central bank. The amount of gross oﬃcial reserves expanded
from USD 6 billion in 1994 to more than USD 28 billion in 1998. These liquidity inﬂows
triggered oﬀ a boom in the credit market with the total amount of loans increasing from
USD 17 billion to 38 billion over the same period. At the same time, the increasing
performances and the constant improvement of banks’ health along with harsh compe-
tition for customers could only have a favourable impact on the supply of credit. The
rise in loan supply was so sensitive that it was largely disproportionate as compared
with the change in loan demand over the period at issue. By and large, between 1995
and 1998, the banks’ main problem was to ﬁnd a sensible creditworthy borrower rather
than the necessary funds for its ﬁnancing. However, this situation changed suddenly
in 1999. First, there was an increase in the instability of real activity. Whereas the
average annual growth rate of GDP was nearly 6 per cent in the 1994-1998 period, it
decreased to 4.1 per cent in 1999 and 4.0 per cent in 2000. It fell to only 1 per cent
in 2001, reaching an all-time low of 0.2 per cent in the fourth quarter. Second, those
economic events were concomitant with tremendous deterioration of the supply side of
the credit market. Indeed, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans upsurged
from 10.9 per cent in 1998 to 13.7 per cent in 1999, and was exceeding 18 per cent at
the end of 2001. Moreover, banks’ proﬁtability, as measured in terms of the gross proﬁt
to income ratio, tumbled from an average of 14.5 per cent between 1995 and 1998 to
4.5 per cent from 1999 to 2001. On the whole, since the end of 1999 banks have tried
to preserve their activity by contracting their credit supply and investing in riskless
assets. For these diﬀerent reasons, it is highly probable that the Polish credit market
was characterized by a disequilibrium state in the 1990s. The symptoms are so obvious
that this is a textbook case for applying disequilibrium theories developed in the 1970s.
The ﬁrst research objective of this paper is to conﬁrm econometrically the switch
observed in the Polish loan market and to test the disequilibrium hypothesis. In this
respect, we apply standard methods issued from a behavior rule, the “min” condition,
based on the voluntary exchange principle. The underlying idea is that the observed
amount of loans is equal to the minimum of quantities demanded and supplied, which
are assumed to be unobservable. A very important strand of the literature has been
devoted to the estimation of this sort of models since the 1970s. Here, we adopt the
standard maximum likelihood estimation method developed by Maddala and Nelson
(1974). Yet, we show that the implementation of this technique does not allow to iden-
tify the type of disequilibrium a priori expected on the Polish loan market. The results
are highly counter-intuitive, in particular as far as the identiﬁcation of the regimes
in the 1994:02-2002:02 period is concerned. Indeed, for all diﬀerent speciﬁcations we
obtain the opposite regimes to the ones we anticipated. The model generates a high
estimated probability of a supply regime over the major part of the period under consid-
2eration and a demand regime at its end. These ﬁndings are robust to the speciﬁcation
choice but are completely at odds with the analysis one can make about the Polish loan
market over the sample period. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons
for the existing gap between the econometric evidence and the expected results.
The bottom line of our paper is to give an insight into this empirical puzzle. More
precisely, we call the attention on the phenomenon of stochastic non-stationarity in a
disequilibrium setting. As a matter of fact, it appears that almost all of our series are
non-stationary. Additionally, the assumption of cointegration is strongly rejected for
most of the equilibrium linear speciﬁcations under study. In consequence, the question
is to know how to use the concept of cointegration within a non-linear conﬁguration
such as the “min” condition given that, by deﬁnition, the loan demand and supply
variables are unobservable.
As a matter of fact, we think that it is highly probable that there is no cointegrating
relationship between the unobservable variables and the set of explanatory variables
speciﬁed in each regime. Even considering that such a cointegrating relationship might
exist, a simple speciﬁcation error, like the omission of at least one non-stationary ex-
plicative variable in one of the two regimes would lead inexorably to the apparition of
non-stationary residuals in one or both regimes. Yet, in that case (stemming from the
absence of a “structural” cointegrating relationship or from the omission of one non-
stationary variable of the cointegrating space), it is no longer possible to estimate the
disequilibrium model using the maximum likelihood methodology proposed by Mad-
dala and Nelson (1974). When residuals in at least one regime are non-stationary, the
log-likelihood function is then asymptotically degenerated and its use in a estimation
procedure would lead to a spurious estimation. As a result, the identiﬁed demand and
supply regimes, based on non convergent estimates of structural parameters, may be
aberrant. Ultimately, what is at stake is that one cannot test ex-post or ex-ante for the
existence of a cointegrating relationship in each regime, i.e. for the stationarity of the
residuals because the “true” demand and supply functions are by nature unobservable.
If this kind of conﬁguration were to occur, just like for the linear models, the so-
lution would consist in identifying the demand and supply regimes using stationary
variables in levels or variables stationarized by diﬀerencing. That is why we present
in this paper a ﬁrst approach to dealing with this problem that consists in estimating
a disequilibrium model with stationary data. If there is disequilibrium between loan
demand and supply it clearly appears that there are necessarily at least two regimes
when using the stationary transform (annual growth rate or long diﬀerence) of the ob-
served quantity of credit. The only diﬀerence being that the switching regime rule is no
longer the “min” condition. Nevertheless, as the ﬁrst approximation we propose to use
a standard ML procedure framework by estimating a model with stationary data and
containing the “min” condition. First, it appears that the obtained results are robust
and economically founded. In the most sophisticated speciﬁcations all coeﬃcients have
the expected sign and virtually all variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Second, and
more importantly, the set and the timing of regimes we identify are in line with the
stylized facts pertaining to the history of the Polish loan market. Even though this
solution to the issue of non-stationarity in the absence of cointegrating relationship
3(spurious regression conﬁguration) is not completely satisfactory, it is a ﬁrst step in the
right direction. It clearly shows that in the Polish case, if relevant, the identiﬁcation
of regimes must be done with the stationary components of both the amount of credit
and the observable explanatory variables, and not directly with the variables in levels.
Overall, considering the Polish loan market disequilibrium in the 1990s, the main
ﬁnding of the paper at hand is that the identiﬁcation of a disequilibrium in the loan mar-
ket with a model containing the “min” condition cannot be done with non-stationary
data. The upshot is that the identiﬁcation of diﬀerent regimes and hence the assessment
of the disequilibrium should be made with stationary components of the variables.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy recall the traditional
maximum likelihood method for estimating models of markets in disequilibrium. In
section 3, the results obtained on the Polish credit market are presented and compared
to the main stylized facts. Section 4 exposes the main issues of the non-stationarity in
a disequilibrium representation. In section 5, we propose estimates for a disequilibrium
model with stationary data and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Disequilibrium econometrics: the “min” condition
Since Fair and Jaﬀee (1972) an important literature has been devoted to the economet-
ric problems associated with estimating demand and supply schedules in disequilibrium
markets. The main approach consists in using some maximum likelihood (ML)m e t h -
ods. In a seminal paper, Maddala and Nelson (1974) derived the general likelihood
function for diﬀerent disequilibrium models and proposed the appropriate ML esti-
mating procedures. The simplest model considered by the authors is as follows:
dt = x0
1,tβ1 + ε1,t (1)
st = x0
2,tβ2 + ε2,t (2)
qt =m i n ( dt,s t)( 3 )
where dt denotes the unobservable quantity demanded during period t, st the unob-
servable quantity supplied during period t, x0
1,t =
³
x
(1)
1,t x
(1)
2,t...x
(1)
K1,t
´0
is a vector of K1
explanatory variables that inﬂuence dt, x0
2,t =
³
x
(2)
1,t x
(2)
2,t...x
(2)
K2,t
´0
is a vector of K2 ex-
planatory variables that inﬂuence st, β1 and β2 are respectively (K1,1) and (K2,1)
vectors of parameters. We assume that dt and st are unobservable at date t, whereas
x1,t and x2,t are observable. The variable qt denotes the actual quantity observed at
time t. The equation (3) is the crucial disequilibrium hypothesis, which allows for the
possibility that the price of the exchanged good is not perfectly ﬂexible and rationing
occurs. More generally, (3) indicates that any disequilibrium which takes place, i.e. any
divergence between the quantity supplied and demanded, results from lack of complete
price adjustment. Therefore, on the basis of voluntary exchange the “short side” of the
market prevails. Because of the equation (3), the model itself determines the probabil-
ities with which each observation belongs to either supplied or demanded quantities.
In what follows, we brieﬂy develop the theoretical underpinnings of this result.
4In a ﬁrst version of the model, Maddala and Nelson (1974) assume that both resid-
uals ε1,t and ε2,t are stationary processes, independently and normally distributed with
variance σ2
1 and σ2
2 respectively. Under these regularity assumptions, the transformed
variable ε1,t−ε2,t is normally distributed with a variance equal to σ2 = σ2
1+σ2
2. Hence,
the reduced variable (ε1,t − ε2,t)/σ follows a N (0,1). Then, the probability that the
observation qt belongs to the demand regime, denoted π
(d)
t , can be computed as the
corresponding N (0,1) fractile:
π
(d)
t = P (Dt <S t)=Φ(ht)=
1
√
2π
Z ht
−∞
e−x2
2 dx (4)
where ht =
³
x0
2,tβ2 − x0
1,tβ1
´
/σ, and Φ(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function
of the N (0,1). Symmetrically, the probability to get the supply regime, denoted π
(s)
t ,
is deﬁned by P (St <D t)=1− Φ(ht).
Let θ denote the vector of structural parameters θ =( β1 β2 σ1 σ2)
0. In order to com-
pute the marginal density, fQt (qt), of the observable variable qt, we consider the joint
density of dt and st, denoted gDt,St (dt,s t). Given the deﬁnition of the disequilibrium,
we know that:
fQt (qt)=fQt|Dt<St (qt)+fQt|St<Dt (qt)( 5 )
Then, we get the corresponding marginal density of qt on the two subsets (cf. Appendix
(A.1)):
fQt|Dt<St (qt)=
Z ∞
qt=dt
gDt,St (dt,z)dz (6)
fQt|St<Dt (qt)=
Z ∞
qt=st
gDt,St (z,st)dz (7)
Finally, we obtain the unconditional density function of Qt:
fQt (qt)=fQt (qt,θ)=
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (qt,z) dz +
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (z,qt) dz (8)
Next, conditionally to a structural parameters set θ and a sample of observable variables
qt,x 1,t and x2,t observed on T periods, the log-likelihood function of the model is then
deﬁned by:
L(θ)=
T X
t=1
log[fQt (qt,θ)] (9)
If we assume that both residuals ε1 and ε2 are independent, the unconditional density
function of Qt c a nb ee x p r e s s e da sf o l l o w s :
fQt (qt)=
1
σ1
φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
Φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
+
1
σ2
φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
Φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
(10)
5where φ(.) denotes the normal N (0,1) density function. The proof is provided in
Appendix (A.1). In this case, the ﬁrst and second order derivatives of L(θ)c a nb e
computed analytically (Maddala and Nelson, 1974) or numerically. We can use an
iterative procedure like the Newton-Raphson procedure to obtain the ML estimates
of the structural parameters θ. Given the estimated values of the parameters, we can
compute the estimated probability that the observation qt belongs either to the demand
or the supply regime, b π
(d)
t and b π
(s)
t .
3 Credit market in Poland and disequilibrium
We now propose to estimate a disequilibrium model on the credit market in Poland
during the 1990s. For diﬀerent reasons already exposed in the introduction, such a
model may be a priori a good representation of the evolution of the credit market
conditions.
3.1 Data description
Our data set covers the period from February 1994 to February 2002, including 97
monthly observations. All data are obtained from the National Bank of Poland (here-
after NBP), except the industrial production (PRODt) and import prices (IMPt),
which come from the Monthly Bulletin publication of the Polish Central Statistical
Oﬃce (GUS).
Most of the series used in this study are deﬁned for a set of banks. The sample
includes 20 banks in February 1994 and 11 in February 2002 (the diﬀerence due to the
consolidation process). It represents on average for the period under consideration 75.3
per cent of the banking system in terms of total corporates’ banking debt and 84.7 per
cent in terms of total deposits. The variables calculated for our sample of banks pertain
to residents and non residents sectors and are deﬁned as follows. For the loan series, Qt,
we use total zloty denominated loans up to one year extended to the Polish corporate
sector1. This series represents on average for the period under consideration 36.5 per
cent of total credit extended to ﬁrms for our sample of banks, and 27.5 per cent taking
the whole Polish banking sector. The loan interest rate, ILt, is an arithmetical mean
of 3-month, 6-month and 1-year weighted averages for minimum loan rates applied to
Polish ﬁrms. As for total deposits, DEPt, we use the sum of demand and time zloty
and foreign currency deposits and of interests on those deposits of both households
and ﬁrms, whereas time deposits, SAVt,a r ed e ﬁned only for ﬁrms and also include
interests on deposits. Lastly, the OLt variable, concerns only the corporate sector and
is deﬁned as the following ratio: zloty denominated loans beyond one year plus total
foreign currency loans divided by total extended loans.
The remaining series are deﬁned at the aggregate level. The intervention rate of
the central bank, ICt, is a weighted average of 1 to 14-day reverse operation rates
and that of the central bank securities issued for diﬀerent maturities between February
1994 and January 1998. Since then, it is equal to the actual rate on 28-day NBP bills
1The “corporate sector” includes state-owned enterprises, private enterprises with up to 9 or more
employees, cooperatives, and farmers.
6(also taking into account the average rate of outright operations). The variable called
LNFAt is the ratio of net foreign assets of the central bank to the overall value of
banking funds absorbed by sterilization operations led by the NBP, which include the
net value of reverse repos, outright and NBP bills issue operations and the value of
required reserves. Finally, ATBt measures the share of Treasury bills to total banking
assets.
In all models the variables are in nominal terms, expressed in logarithm, except for
the interest rates which are measured in percentage points.
3.2 Estimation results
One of the main issue in disequilibrium models is the speciﬁcation choice of both regime
equations. Since demand and supply are not continuously observable, a speciﬁcation
error (the omission of an explicative variable in x1,t or x2,t for instance) can lead to
the non relevance of one of the assumptions used in the construction of the likelihood
function (εj,t i.i.d. for instance). The estimates b θ are then derived from an inadequate
ML procedure and the ﬁt b st and b dt may be based on biased estimates of structural
parameters. Consequently, it is diﬃcult to test ex-post the presence of a speciﬁcation
error since the true processes, st and dt, are unobservable. This is why we consider
several speciﬁcations of the disequilibrium models on the Polish loan market. The
results are reproduced in Table (1).
––– Insert Table 1 –––
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (model 1), the loan demand and supply equations are each
assumed to be described by only one variable. More precisely, DEPt, which denotes
total zloty and foreign currency deposits of households and ﬁrms, is expected to have
ap o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient in the loan supply equation. SAVt is a proxy for ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow
and is expected to have a negative impact on loan demand. First, as we can see from
Table (1), both variables are signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow has
the wrong sign. Second, and more strikingly, the adjusted R-squared statistics is also
very high (almost equal to 1), as is the t-statistics of the DEPt variable. Finally, we
note that the frequency of the supply regime amounts to 82 per cent.
The drawback of estimating model 1 is that there is only one variable speciﬁct o
each function. Therefore we include several additional variables in model 2 in order
to better discriminate between loan demand and supply. The loan interest rate, ILt,
is expected to have a negative sign in the demand function and a positive sign in the
supply one. Due to the substitution eﬀect, the intervention rate of the NBP, ICt,
should have the opposite sign to ILt in both equations. In the disequilibrium loan
market literature2, a lagged index of industrial production is often used to approximate
the ﬁrms’ and the banks’ expectations about future economic activity and to have a
positive coeﬃcient. Following the Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) model and the bank
lending channel literature, a positive dependence of loan demand on output is assumed
due to working capital or liquidity considerations. Yet, the latter assumption is rather
ambiguous if the corporate sector loan demand is considered. As a matter of fact, a
2See, for instance, Sealey (1979), Kim (1999), Pazarba¸ sio˘ glu (1997).
7drop in industrial production will probably strengthen the liquidity constraint of ﬁrms,
thus increasing their short-term credit demand. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Dale
and Haldane (1995) among others, ﬁnd a short-term increase in bank lending to the
corporate sector in the wake of tight money. Given these arguments, the theoretical
sign of the parameter of industrial production, PRODt, is indeterminate. The results
of estimates of model 2 indicate that the parameters of all variables are signiﬁcant and,
except SAVt, have the expected signs. Moreover, the frequency of the loan demand
regime increased to 28 per cent, but the quality of the model, as measured by the value
of the log-likelihood, improved only slightly.
In order to verify the robustness of the latter ﬁndings, we estimated a third model
with two additional variables as compared with model 2. The purpose of the ﬁrst
one, OLt, is to capture the impact of other loans extended to the corporate sector.
Introduced in the loan demand equation, the corresponding coeﬃcient is expected to
have a positive sign in the case of complementary eﬀects or a negative one if other
banking means can be substituted for zloty denominated loans up to one year. The
second variable, ATBt, is a rough measure of the imperfect substitutability between
bonds and loans mainly due to changes in the riskiness of ﬁnancial intermediation. It is
expected to bear a negative coeﬃcient in the loan supply function. Although the extra
variables are signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient of ATBt has the predicted sign, the results
reported for model 3 in Table (1) clearly reveal that, except the intervention rate in
loan demand equation, the interest rates in both loan demand and supply equations
are no longer signiﬁcant. What is worse is that three out of four parameters do not
have the expected sign. Nevertheless, the quality of the model increased with regard
to the value of the L statistics, but the split between the two regimes has remained
unchanged.
Until now none of the variables does explicitly take into account the openness of
the Polish economy and its impact on the credit market. Consequently, we deal with
this issue by introducing two additional variables. On the supply side of the market,
LNFAt aims at measuring the net liquidity impact on banks of the foreign reserves
accumulation by the central bank due to the exchange rate intervention. One could
claim that LNFAt is no longer an appropriate indicator since the implementation of
the ﬂoating exchange rate system, i.e. since at least June 19993. However, according
to OECD (2001), the NBP continued to make oﬀ market foreign exchange transactions
as an agent of the government in 2000 and early 2001. This had the same impact
on banking liquidity than market interventions. On the demand side of the market,
we include the index of import prices, IMPt, which is expected to have a positive
coeﬃcient. The idea behind introducing this variable is that a change in import prices
of intermediate and industrial goods will directly aﬀect the production costs of ﬁrms and
hence their loan demand4. As for the model 3 estimates, both supplementary variables
t u r no u tt ob es i g n i ﬁcant and their coeﬃcients have the expected signs. Despite huge
sterilization operations, the heavy build-upo ft h eN B P ’ sn e tf o r e i g na s s e t sa p p e a r st o
have a positive impact on loan supply, whereas changes in import prices also come into
3Date at which the NBP deﬁnitively stopped its foreign exchange market interventions by abolishing
ﬁxing transactions.
4It should be noted that in the second half of the nineties, the imports to GDP ratio was about 10
per cent in Poland.
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play in the credit behavior of ﬁrms. Nonetheless, apart from the loan interest rate
in the demand equation other interest rates still lack statistical signiﬁcance and the
loan interest rate parameter in the supply equation is wrongly signed. In model 5, we
checked whether these ﬁndings are not driven by some collinearity problems between
the interest rates. To this end, we used the spread, ILt − ICt, and the intervention
rate, ICt, instead of ILt and ICt in each equation. The results reported in Table (1)
are identical to those of model 4. When introducing a one lag structure on the interest
rates as in model 6, both interest rates in the loan demand equation have the expected
sign and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. But, concerning the loan supply interest
rate coeﬃcients, the problem still persists. Yet, the quality of the model improves as
it leads to a higher value of the L statistics.
To sum up, when applying the Maddala and Nelson (1974) approach to the Polish
loan market, the coeﬃcients of some variables, especially those of interest rates, are
not signiﬁcant and/or do not bear the expected sign. Actually, this is particularly
true for the loan interest rate in the supply equation. More generally, ﬁnding that,
whatever the side of the market, interest rates do not seem to play a signiﬁcant role
or even act in the opposite direction to what one could expect is puzzling. However,
these observations are not the most worrisome. Our estimates reveal the existence of a
succession of two regimes. Figure (1) shows the estimated probabilities of each regime
for the best model in terms of the log-likelihood statistics, i.e. for model 6. It appears
that the loan market was characterized by an almost permanent and strong supply
regime until the end of 2000. A demand regime unambiguously have emerged since the
beginning of 2001. It should be noted that these results seem robust since models 1, 2,
3, and 4 yielded very similar conﬁgurations of both regimes.
9These results on the timing of supply and demand regimes are undoubtedly not
representative of the recent history of the Polish loan market.
First, ﬁxed exchange rate policies followed until at least June 1999 can be expected
to have had a positive, long-standing and pronounced impact on the loan supply. On
the one hand, sterilization operations of capital inﬂows created since the end of 1993
a structural overliquidity of the banking system, deﬁned as a net indebtedness of the
central bank towards commercial banks. They potentially rendered demand regimes
much more likely. At the same time, since these capital inﬂows were in fact imperfectly
sterilized5, they also had a direct favorable impact on loan supply. In the light of these
facts, the ﬁnding of a supply regime in the 1990s does not seem plausible.
Second, banks’ health considerably improved since 1994. Actually, the share of
non-performing loans in total loans for enterprises and households decreased steadily
from 31 per cent in 1993 to 28.7 per cent in 1994 reaching a low point of 9.8 per cent
in September 1997. However, the ratio experienced an upsurge from 10.9 per cent in
December 1998 to 13.7 per cent in December 1999, and attained a 18.3 per cent level
in December 2001 (for the corporate sector only, the corresponding ﬁgures were 11.9,
15.1, and 20.4 per cent, respectively). Obviously, these stylized facts lead us to expect
the opposite regimes to the one we obtained by the estimates.
Third, a credit boom occurred in the loan market from mid-1996 to mid-1997. As
of December 1996, in order to curb the credit expansion, the central bank started to
tighten up progressively its monetary policy by rising both the interest rates and the
reserve requirement ratios. However, considering that these measures did not yield
the expected results on banks’ behavior, thereby recognizing the failure of the tradi-
tional monetary instruments, the central bank resorted to an exceptional measure. In
September 1997 it started to accept deposits directly from the public. Again, these
observations strongly suggest that the credit boom was rather led by supply factors
and not demand-driven.
––– Insert Table 2 –––
Fourth, although 1993 is often considered in the literature as a typical “credit
crunch” year due to the “bad-loans” problem underwent by the Polish banking sector
in the wake of the 1990-1991 transformational recession, it does not necessarily imply
that this state of the market prevailed in the subsequent years. This lends support to
the fact that following the governmental recapitalization program6, we should expect
the opposite. What needs to be stressed here is that in 1994 the level of credit, measured
by the ratio of credit to the corporate sector to GDP (see Table (2)) was extremely low
hardly reaching 17.1 per cent of GDP. Therefore, a strong increase in its volume was
likely to occur. Moreover, in the same year, there was an almost 40 per cent decline of
the ratio as compared with 1989, and a 25 per cent as compared with 1991. As a result,
if since 1994 banks might have wanted to build up their market shares on a healthy
basis again, then we should observe a demand regime in the 1990s rather than a supply
one.
5Boﬁnger and Wollmersh¨ auser (2002) ﬁn di nt h eP o l i s hc a s ea na b s o l u t es t e r i l i z a t i o nc o e ﬃcient
e q u a lt o0 . 8 9o v e rt h ep e r i o df r o m1 9 9 1 : 1 2t o1 9 9 8 : 0 9 .
6Taking the average current exchange rate for each year, the govermental recapitalization amouted
to USD 1.14 billion in 1993 and USD 1.75 USD billion in 1994.
104 Disequilibrium representation and non-stationarity
Hence, the issue is to understand how such unexpected results can be obtained from the
standard method of estimating disequilibrium models. There are three main competing
explanations, which may lay at the root of our striking ﬁndings. The ﬁrst concerns the
reliability of the estimation procedure, the second deals with the “min” condition used
to represent the credit market disequilibrium and the third concerns the empirical
reliability of the disequilibrium assumption for the Polish credit market. However, our
interpretation consists to add a fourth explanation based on the non-stationarity of the
data used in this exercise.
4.1 How to interpret the estimation results?
The ﬁrst source of explanation may be linked to the ML estimation technique used to
identify the demand and supply regimes. Two issues are worth mentioning as regards
the estimation technique. The ﬁrst is linked to the convergence of the iterative proce-
dure. Indeed, the optimization method of the log-likelihood function L(θ) (equation
(9)) should be handled very carefully since the global concavity of L(θ) is not assured.
For instance, when one chooses one or both of the variance residuals σi,c l o s et o0 ,
the function L(θ) converges toward inﬁnity. Let us consider positive ﬁnite values for
β1, β2 and σ2. In this case, the second member of (10) is ﬁnite. But, the ﬁrst term is
degenerated if σ1 converges to zero:
1
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1,tβ1 − qt
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!
Indeed, if σ1 converges to zero, 1/σ1φ(.)c o n v e r g e st o∞, since given the properties
of the normal distribution, lim
x→∞ xφ(x)=∞. The term Φ(.) converges to 1 since
lim
x→∞ Φ(x) = 1. By analogy, the same analysis applies to the second member of (10),
which is degenerated if σ2 converges to zero for given positive ﬁnite values of β1,β2
and σ1. Then, the global maximum of the likelihood function is inﬁnity, if one of
the residual variances (or both) converges to zero. Therefore, the application of the
standard ML procedure should be adapted in this case as only local maximum must
be searched for. That is why in our application we use three diﬀerent algorithms of
optimization in order to evaluate the robustness of our estimates: (i) Newton Raphson
with numerical or analytical gradient and Hessian matrix (ii)N e l d e r - M e a ds i m p l e x
method (iii) Newton Raphson with non-negativity constraints on σi.
The second concern refers to the starting values used for the optimization algo-
rithms. There are various methods to obtain the initial conditions on structural pa-
rameters θ used in the ML optimization. Here, we use a two step OLS procedure
detailed in Appendix (A.2). This procedure applied to artiﬁcial data leads to the con-
vergence of all the optimization algorithms used and gives estimates, which are very
close to the true set of parameters. As a result, it does not seem the right direction for
ﬁnding the explanation of our striking empirical results.
The second potential explanation deals with the choice of the “min” condition,
which might be an inadequate way to describe the disequilibrium in the loan market.
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Yet, it seems important to note that this class of models has robust microfoundations
from the “short side” rule, with a theoretical justiﬁcation based on the voluntary ex-
change principle. Rather, the problem can stem from the known issue of aggregation.
As aggregate data are averages of corporate data, some ﬁrms may be credit constrained
whereas the average ﬁrm may not (Perez, 1998).
The third preoccupation is related to the empirical validity of the disequilibrium
assumption in the Polish case. For the reasons already exposed, it seems clear that a
modiﬁcation of the credit market conditions occurred in the end of the 1990s. However,
this change does not necessarily imply that the disequilibrium representation matches
the Polish stylized facts. Another way to check the disequilibrium hypothesis is to
evaluate the transmission of the monetary policy. Actually, if the price of loans is not
perfectly ﬂexible and does not clear the loan market, i.e. if the disequilibrium hypothesis
is relevant, then, at ﬁrst sight, we should not observe a smooth transmission of monetary
policy controlled interest rates to loan rates. Opiela (1999) provides evidence for Poland
that the responsiveness of loan rates to policy-inﬂuenced rates was less than 1 over the
period from 1994:01 to 1998:03. We ﬁnd the same result with our data set when we
compute a set of rolling correlations of monthly changes in the intervention rate, ICt,
with monthly changes in the spread between the loan rate, ILt, and the intervention
rate. For each month in our sample a correlation coeﬃcient is estimated using a 24-
month moving window of data.
As can be seen from Figure (2), the estimated correlation coeﬃcient remains signif-
12icantly negative and stable until November 1998, signalling a substantial lending rate
stickiness to changes in the policy controlled interest rate. Since then, and except for
the end of the period, the correlation coeﬃcient is almost never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero indicating a good adjustment of the loan rate to changes in the policy rate.
However, even if both interest rates move in tandem it does not necessarily preclude
the existence of a disequilibrium in the credit market. Indeed, the adjustment of the
loan rate may be still insuﬃcient in order to clear the loan market.
Figure 3: Kernel Density of the Annual Growth Rate of the Quantity of Loans to the
Corporate Sector
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Finally, the last argument in favor of the disequilibrium hypothesis on the Polish
credit market is the following. Figure (3) represents the Kernel density estimates of
the annual growth rate of loans to the corporate sector. As we can see, the empirical
density has the general form of a mixture of normal distributions. Such observation is
particularly compatible with a disequilibrium model in which the “short side” of the
market prevails.
4.2 The non-stationarity hypothesis
Here, we propose another potential explanation for our results. For several reasons,
the focus of the discussion is shifted to the issue of non-stationarity of the data used
in the estimates. We call attention to this problem since, except for the interest rates,
virtually all the observed variables used in the disequilibrium models are I(1) processes.
The results of unit root tests are reported in Appendix (A.3). If the loan market was
continually in equilibrium, the following standard approach would be adopted. The
model would simply be estimated using a linear speciﬁcation, i.e. by regressing the
observed amount of loans on all the explanatory variables of both loan demand and
supply functions. The estimates would be made in levels in the presence of a cointe-
grating relationship and in ﬁrst diﬀerences otherwise. At least in models 1 and 2, the
cointegration tests in linear models indicate the absence of cointegration relationship.
So, if the disequilibrium hypothesis is rejected in these models, the linear represen-
tation of the observed quantity of loans must be based on the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
non-stationary series. How does it look like in the disequilibrium representation? How
13can we transpose the concepts of cointegration if the equilibrium assumption is vio-
lated and the loan market can be described by a disequilibrium model with a “min”
condition? What are the consequences of the use of the standard ML procedure when
the cointegration is rejected in one of the two regimes?
In order to precise the inﬂuence of non-stationarity in the “min” representation,
let us consider the initial model (equations (1), (2) and (3)) and assume that all ob-
served explicative variables x
(i)
j,t are generated by an integrated stochastic process. For
simplicity, let us assume a pure random walk process ∀j =1 ,..,K i,∀i =1 ,2:
∆x
(i)
j,t = µ
(i)
j,t (11)
where the innovations processes µ
(i)
j,t are i.i.d. W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tb o t hd e m a n ddt
and supply st are integrated processes. As a result, two conﬁgurations appear: the ﬁrst
called the cointegrating representation and the second called the spurious regression
representation.
In the ﬁrst case, we have, in each regime, a linear relation between a non-stationary
unobservable dependent variable and non-stationary explicative variables x
(i)
j,t. We fur-
ther assume that, in each regime, there is a cointegrating relationship between these
variables represented by:
dt = x0
1,te β1 + η1,t (12)
st = x0
2,te β2 + η2,t (13)
where processes η1,t and η2,t are I (0). In this case, the log-likelihood of the observation
qt is well-deﬁned since the regularities assumptions are satisﬁed. The maximum likeli-
hood methods can be applied to estimate the parameters of the models and to identify
the corresponding regimes. If we also assume that there is a cointegrating relationship
between the demand dt, and the supply st, i.e. these unobservable variables share the
same common stochastic trend, then the model can be rewritten as:
dt = x0
1,te β1 + η1,t (14)
st = dt + ζt (15)
where the process ζt is stationary. In this case, we can also apply the Laroque and
Salani´ e (1997) strategy based on a ﬁrst diﬀerences ﬁnal form.
In the second case, i.e. the spurious regression representation,w ea l s oh a v eal i n e a r
relation between a non-stationary unobservable dependent variable and non-stationary
explicative variables x
0(i)
j,t . But we assume that, in each regime, there is no cointegrating
relationship between these variables. In other words, we have:
dt = x0
1,tβ1 + ε1,t (16)
st = x0
2,tβ2 + ε2,t (17)
where ε1,t and ε2,t are I (1) processes. It should be noted that such a framework does
not necessarily imply the absence of a long run relationship between dt and st. The
14problem in this case is that the likelihood of the disequilibrium model is asymptotically
degenerated since the residuals do not have a stationary distribution. The standard
ML procedure is then not appropriate asymptotically since the marginal distribution
(10) of qt is not well deﬁned. For a ﬁnite sample, when considering wrongly the Mad-
dala and Nelson’s likelihood function, the numerical optimization may not converge or
may converge, but then leads to non-convergent estimates of the structural parame-
ters. Thus, the identiﬁcation of the supply and demand regimes becomes impossible or
fallacious.
What is the most plausible representation? It is undoubtedly the second one. In-
deed, in this context a simple speciﬁcation error, as the omission of an integrated re-
gressor, leads to the apparition of the spurious regression representation. For instance,
let us assume that the cointegrating representations (12) and (13) are the true ones
and that we make a speciﬁcation error in the estimation of the model. If we note e x1,t
the vector of explicative variables used in which we omit for instance the Kth
1 element
of the true vector x1,t. The excluded element, denoted x
(1)
K1,t, is by construction I (1).
Then we have:
dt = x0
1,te β1 + η1,t = e x0
1,tβ1 + x
(1)
K1,tβ
(1)
K1 + η1,t = e x0
1,tβ1 + ε1,t (18)
where the residual ε1,t = x
(1)
K1,tβ
(1)
K1 +η1,t is non-stationary and may be identiﬁed to the
residual of equation (16). In this false speciﬁcation, we do not have a cointegrating
relationship between dt and the speciﬁed set of cointegrating variables. Yet, the central
issue is that we cannot test for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between dt
and the explanatory variables since the demand dt is unobservable. Even for periods
when the demand regime occurs (i.e. qt = dt)i ti sn o tp o s s i b l et ot e s tt h ec o i n t e g r a t i n g
relationship since the likelihood is not deﬁned for non-stationary residuals. Moreover,
even ex-post it is impossible to test for a cointegrating relationship because the esti-
mates of dt and st are derived from the maximization of a degenerated function. All in
all, a speciﬁcation error in both unobservable regimes or even the simple omission of at
least one integrated regressor can lead to the spurious regression representation.
5 The disequilibrium model with stationary data
The previous section revealed that the non-stationarity of our data could lead, in the
absence of a cointegrating relationship between the unobservable variable and the cor-
responding set of explanatory variables (which is a highly probable outcome), to a
fallacious identiﬁcation of regimes. In order to detect whether such a conﬁguration
is responsible for our striking results on the Polish loan market, we propose here to
identify the disequilibrium in a regime perspective, but not necessarily with a “min”
condition. The idea behind this ﬁrst approximation is as follows. If the true data gener-
ating process of qt is such as qt =m i n( dt,s t), the dynamic of any linear transformation
of the loan variable must satisfy at least two regimes. In particular, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences
series ∆qt (or the long diﬀerence ∆zqt = qt − qt−z) follows a four-regime dynamics,
where there are two regimes of statu-quo with demand superior (or inferior) to supply
at two points in time (t and t − 1, or t and t − z) and two regimes of switch from
15demand to supply or vice versa. Then, the idea is to identify the disequilibrium regime
with stationary transformations of data as we would realize in a linear representation.
In such conﬁguration the main diﬃculty is to deﬁne the transition rule (which is not
exactly the “min” condition) and to identify both switching regimes for which we can
reasonably think that there are very few observations. For instance, in an eight-year
sample, we can expect at most two or three changes of regimes from a demand regime
to a supply one or vice versa. As a result, in order to identify the disequilibrium on
the credit market with stationary series, a two-regime model is more plausible and
technically more feasible than a four-regime one.
In this section, we analyze the disequilibrium in the loan market using stationary
data. More precisely, we achieve stationarity by applying long diﬀerences (more pre-
cisely, annual growth rates) to each series, with the exception of the interest rates,
which are stationary in levels. In such a setting, the disequilibrium model with the
“min” condition from the previous section should simply be considered as a regime-
switching model among others with a contemporaneous threshold variable. We now
consider the following model:
∆dt = ∆x0
1,tβ1 + µ1,t (19)
∆st = ∆x0
2,tβ2 + µ2,t (20)
∆qt =m i n ( ∆Dt,∆St)( 2 1 )
where ∆dt denotes the annual growth rate of the unobservable demanded quantity
of loans during period t, ∆st the annual growth rate of the unobservable supplied
quantity of loans during period t. As in section 1, residuals µ1,t and µ2,t are assumed
stationary and independently and normally distributed. The above model is to be
considered as a regime-switching model that allows for two regimes for characterizing
∆qt. Given equation (21), the growth rate of the amount of loans exchanged in the
market corresponds to the minimum of the loan supply and demand growth rates. In
other words, a demand (supply) regime takes place if the growth rate of the quantity of
loans is determined by the variables and their parameters associated with the annual
increase in loan demand (supply). The occurrence of regimes, i.e. any divergence
between ∆dt and ∆st, indicates the existence of a disequilibrium in level in the loan
market. Indeed, if the level of demand is equal to the level of supply at each date
(i.e. dt = st), the annual growth rate of loan demand equals that of loan supply
(i.e. ∆dt = ∆st). However, since the quantity of loans and thereby the estimates of
the unobservable loan demand and supply variables are deﬁned here as annual growth
rates, our methodology precludes the identiﬁcation of the type of disequilibrium in level
form (whether the level of loan demand exceeds the level of loan supply or vice versa).
Hence, with this “min” model on stationary data we have only an approximation of
the dynamic of ∆qt if the disequilibrium model qt =m i n( dt,s t) is the true DGP.
The results for all models are reported in Table (3).
––– Insert Table 3 –––
Starting with model 1, the coeﬃcients of the total deposits (DEPt)a n do ft h ep r o x y
for ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow (SAVt) appear signiﬁcant and have the expected signs. Moreover,
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the adjusted R-squared statistics is not as high as in the level form speciﬁcation of the
model (0.41 versus 0.991) and, more importantly, the frequency of the supply regime
amounts to only 34 per cent as compared with 82 per cent obtained previously. In
model 2, the result of introducing the interest rates is mixed: they are signiﬁcant and
have well-signed coeﬃcients only in the demand equation. Yet, the other variables are
still signiﬁcant, in particular the industrial production (PRODt), which has a positively
signed coeﬃcient. Finally, although the quality of the model increased in comparison
with model 1, it is nevertheless still fairly low in terms of ¯ R2 statistics. The quality of
the model is improved when the imperfect substitutability between loans and riskless
assets (ATBt) on the supply side is taken into account, and by integrating the other
forms of credit (OLt) on the demand side. Indeed, in model 3 there is a net increase in
the values of the log-likelihood and in the adjusted R-squared statistics. In addition,
all the estimated parameters in both functions have the expected signs and, excepted
the interest rates in the loan supply function, are signiﬁcant. As attested by model 4
estimates, these ﬁndings are robust to the introduction of two extra variables reﬂecting
some open economy aspects, i.e. changes in import prices (IMPt) and the net liquidity
impact of the foreign reserves accumulation by the central bank (LNFAt). As for the
level form estimates, we checked in model 5 that our results are not aﬀected by the
existing collinearity between the interest rates. Finally, with a one lag structure on the
interest rates (cf. model 6), all coeﬃcients have the expected signs and are statistically
signiﬁcant.
Figure (4) plots the estimated probabilities of demand and supply regimes issued
from model 6 and Figure (5) plots the corresponding supply and demand growth rates
of quantities.
These results corroborate with what one could expect on the Polish credit market.
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A long-lasting period of a demand regime until mid-1999 and an unambiguous appari-
tion of a supply regime since then. Both regimes match well with several stylized facts
related to the Polish loan market. Let us ﬁrst consider the demand regime. Its occur-
rence actually coexists with the period of capital inﬂows under the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. This led to an accumulation of foreign reserves by the central bank, particu-
larly strong between 1995 and 1998 (see Table (4)). Yet, since these capital inﬂows were
imperfectly sterilized, they fueled a boom in the credit market. At the same time, the
performance and the health of the banking system improved considerably. As shown
in Table (4), banks’ proﬁtability was raising until 1996 and remained high in 1997,
whereas the percentage of non-performing loans was steadily declining until 1998, thus
increasing the quality of the loan portfolio. Table (4) also provides some clues for the
switch of the market into a supply regime. The supply conditions deteriorated tremen-
dously at the end of the 1990s: non-performing loans started to rise in 1999 while the
gross proﬁt to income ratio has dramatically decreased since 1998.
––– Insert Table 4 –––
It should be stressed that while using the “min” condition with stationary data
yields robust empirical results, it lacks theoretical foundations. The problem is that
the voluntary exchange principle, underlying the model, can only be veriﬁed when data
in levels are used. However, the fundamental conclusion is that if the spurious re-
gression representation is valid, the disequilibrium has to be identiﬁed with stationary
components of the observable data used. Moreover, this representation is highly prob-
able when the models of the demand and supply quantities are under-speciﬁed. The
lower is the number of non-stationary explicative variables in each regime, the higher is
the probability to get such a problem and to have a fallacious identiﬁcation of regimes.
186 Conclusion
The Polish credit market conditions changed dramatically during the 1990s and the
clearing of the market was not completely secured by the adjustments of interest rates.
T h eo b j e c t i v eo fo u rp a p e ri st oc o n ﬁrm econometrically the switch observed in the Pol-
ish loan market and to test the disequilibrium hypothesis. For this reason, we apply the
standard ML methods on the disequilibrium model with a “min” condition. However,
the results are very counter-intuitive, in particular as regards the identiﬁcation of the
regimes in the 1994:02-2002:02 period. It seems that, in our case, the implementation
of this technique does not allow to identify the type of disequilibrium a priori expected
on the Polish loan market.
We propose an explanation of these counter-intuitive results based on the non-
stationarity of the data used. We show that all observed variables are issued from
non-stationary processes and are not cointegrated in the corresponding linear models.
The issue in the disequilibrium model is that it is impossible to test the cointegration
hypothesis in demand and supply equations since demand and supply quantities are
unobservable. But, even though there is a cointegration relationship between quan-
tities and a given set of explanatory non-stationary variables, a simple speciﬁcation
error can lead to a conﬁguration with non-stationary residual in at least one equation.
That is why we assume that residuals in demand and supply equations may be non-
stationary. In this case (spurious regression representation), using wrongly the standard
log-likelihood function (Maddala and Nelson, 1974) may lead to non-convergent esti-
mates of the deep parameters and to a fallacious identiﬁcation of demand and supply
regimes.
In order to asses this proposition, we estimate the disequilibrium model with sta-
tionary data in ﬁrst diﬀerences. In a ﬁrst approximation of the transition rule, we use
the “min” condition on the annual growth rates. This approximation does not reﬂect
the exact dynamic of the growth rate of the observed loan quantities. However, it allows
us to conﬁrm our interpretation of the results obtained for Poland when using variables
in levels. We show that the use of stationary data with an approximation of the tran-
sition rule leads to a very precise identiﬁcation of regimes on the Polish credit market
in the 1990s. Hence, the determination of the appropriate ML estimation method in
the spurious regression representation is the next goal in our research program.
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A.1 Marginal densities of Qt in a stable disequilibrium model
Let us denote gDt,St (dt,s t)t h ej o i n td e n s i t yo fDt and St. We know that the corre-
sponding marginal densities of the unobservable variables Dt and St are deﬁned by:
fDt (dt)=
Z ∞
−∞
gDt,St (dt,z) dz fSt (st)=
Z ∞
−∞
gDt,St (z,st) dz (22)
We have to compute the marginal density of Qt on the two subset Qt = Dt, with
Dt <S t and Qt = St, with St <D t. When Dt <S t, for a given realization dt of Dt, the
marginal density of Qt, is given by the area deﬁned by the joint density gDt,St (dt,z),
for values z of St superior to dt. Under the assumption that Dt <S t, the marginal
density of Qt is then given by:
fQt|Dt<St (qt)=
Z ∞
qt=dt
gDt,St (dt,z) dz (23)
Symmetrically, we get the marginal density of Qt when St <D t.
fQt|St<Dt (qt)=
Z ∞
qt=st
gDt,St (z,st) dz (24)
In the general case, we know that the marginal density of Qt is given by:
fQt (qt)=
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (qt,z) dz +
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (z,qt) dz (25)
Let us assume that both residuals ε1 and ε2 are independent (σ12 = 0). In this case,
the joint density can be expressed as the following simple expression:
gDt,St (dt,s t)=
1
2πσ1σ2
exp


−
1
2


Ã
dt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!2
+
Ã
st − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2



 (26)
=
1
2πσ1σ2
exp

−
1
2
Ã
dt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!2
 × exp

−
1
2
Ã
st − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2

Now, consider the ﬁrst member of the marginal density of Qt (equation (25)):
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (qt,z) dz =
1
2πσ1σ2
Z ∞
qt


exp

−
1
2
Ã
qt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!2
 × exp

−
1
2
Ã
z − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2



dz
=
1
√
2πσ1
exp

−
1
2
Ã
qt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!2
 ×
1
√
2πσ2
Z ∞
qt
exp

−
1
2
Ã
z − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2
dz
In the ﬁrst term of this expression, we recognize the value of the N (0,1) density function
at the particular point
³
qt − x0
1,tβ1
´
/σ1. Indeed:
1
√
2π
exp

−
1
2
Ã
qt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!2
 = φ
Ã
qt − x0
1,tβ1
σ1
!
(27)
21where φ(.) denotes the N (0,1) density function. Since this function is symmetric the
ﬁrst member of the marginal density of Qt can be expressed as:
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (qt,z) dz =
1
σ1
φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
×
1
√
2πσ2
Z ∞
qt
exp

−
1
2
Ã
z − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2
dz
(28)
The second term of this expression can be transformed in order to introduce the N (0,1)
cumulative distribution function, denoted Φ(.). Indeed, let us consider the following
change in variable e z =
³
z − x0
2,tβ2
´
/σ2, with dz = de z σ2. Then, we have:
1
√
2πσ2
Z ∞
qt
exp

−
1
2
Ã
z − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2
dz =
1
√
2πσ2
Z ∞
e qt
exp
Ã
−
e z
2
2!
de z σ2 (29)
=
1
√
2π
Z ∞
e qt
exp
Ã
−
e z
2
2!
de z
with e qt =
³
qt − x0
2,tβ2
´
/σ2. Then, this integral can be expressed as a function Φ(.).
1
√
2πσ2
Z ∞
qt
exp

−
1
2
Ã
z − x0
2,tβ2
σ2
!2
dz =1− Φ(e qt)=Φ(−e qt)( 3 0 )
Finally, we get:
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (qt,z) dz =
1
σ1
φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
Φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
(31)
Symmetrically, we can compute the second term of the marginal density of Qt (equation
(25)) as:
Z ∞
qt
gDt,St (z,qt) dz =
1
σ2
φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
Φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
(32)
Then, the marginal density of Qt is deﬁned by equation (10):
fQt (qt)=
1
σ1
φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
Φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
+
1
σ2
φ
Ã
x0
2,tβ2 − qt
σ2
!
Φ
Ã
x0
1,tβ1 − qt
σ1
!
A.2 The choice of initial condition in the ML optimization procedure
There are various methods to obtain the initial conditions on structural parameters
θ in the ML iteration. Here, we use a two step OLS procedure. First, we consider
the linear regressions of the observation qt on the exogenous variables sets in both
functions: qt = x0
i,tb γi + µi,t, with i =1 ,2. Given the realizations of b γ1 and b γ2, we
compute a ﬁrst approximation of demand and supply, as e dt = x0
1,tb γ1 and e st = x0
2,tb γ2.
Even if we know that b γ1 and b γ2 are not convergent estimators of β1 and β2, we build
22two subgroups of observations. In the ﬁrst subgroup, denoted by index d,w ec o n s i d e r
only the observations on Qt,X 1,t and X2,t for which we have e dt ≤ e st. In the second
subgroup, we consider the observations for which we have e st ≤ e dt. The second step of
the procedure consists in applying the OLS on both subgroups:
q
(d)
t = x
(d)0
1,t
e β1 + e µ1,t and q
(s)
t = x
(s)0
2,t
e β2 + e µ2,t (33)
Then, we use the OLS estimates e βi as starting values for βi in the ML iteration. For
the parameters σ1 and σ2, we adopt the following starting values:
e σi =
1
ni
ni X
j=1
e µi,j i =1 ,2( 3 4 )
where n1 denotes the size of the “demand” subgroup of observations for which we have
e dt ≤ e st, and n2 denotes the size of the corresponding “supply” subgroup. Some Monte
Carlo simulations of the accuracy of this procedure are disposable on request.
A.3 Unit root and cointegration tests
The results of the unit root and cointegration tests are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
––– Insert Table 5 –––
––– Insert Table 6 –––
23Table 1: ML Estimates in Level, II/94 - II/02
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Supply
Constant −0.21∗∗
(−4.00)
−0.65∗∗
(−3.24)
0.78
(1.66)
∗ 0.32
(0.74)
0.32
(0.74)
0.49
(1.57)
ILt 0.004∗∗
(2.57)
−0.003
(−1.51)
−0.0003
(−0.13)
ICt −0.002
(−1.48)
0.003
(1.71)
∗ −0.0002
(−0.11)
−0.0005
(−0.39)
ILt−1 −0.0003
(−0.17)
ICt−1 −0.001
(−1.07)
(IL− IC)t −0.0003
(−0.13)
DEPt 0.90∗∗
(82.85)
0.98∗∗
(27.62)
0.77∗∗
(11.29)
0.77∗∗
(11.81)
0.77∗∗
(11.81)
0.73∗∗
(15.91)
ATBt −0.27∗∗
(−3.28)
−0.19
(−2.56)
∗∗ −0.19∗∗
(−2.56)
−0.16∗∗
(−3.01)
LNFAt 0.17∗∗
(3.47)
0.17∗∗
(3.47)
0.17∗∗
(4.06)
σ1 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.015
Demand
Constant 3.65∗∗
(14.44)
3.46
(7.44)
∗∗ 5.86
(6.12)
∗∗ 2.88
(3.05)
∗∗ 2.88∗∗
(3.04)
5.40∗∗
(6.82)
ILt −0.02∗∗
(−5.98)
−0.001
(−0.31)
−0.006
(−1.77)
∗
ICt 0.02
(6.11)
∗∗ −0.000
(−0.005)
0.003
(1.31)
−0.002
(−1.53)
ILt−1 −0.02∗∗
(−8.35)
ICt−1 0.01∗∗
(7.95)
(IL− IC)t −0.006∗
(−1.77)
PRODt −0.09
(−0.71)
−0.02
(−0.26)
−0.03
(−0.27)
−0.03
(−0.27)
0.12∗∗
(2.24)
SAVt 0.21∗∗
(3.71)
0.39∗∗
(4.23)
0.65∗∗
(9.88)
0.51∗∗
(7.77)
0.51∗∗
(7.75)
0.28∗∗
(4.36)
OLt −2.20
(−4.14)
∗∗ −0.99∗∗
(−2.24)
−0.99∗∗
(−2.24)
−1.80
(−5.20)
∗∗
IMPt 0.61∗∗
(3.41)
0.61∗∗
(3.40)
0.34∗∗
(3.45)
σ2 0.008 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.003
L =2 5 4 .77 L = 256.62 L = 271.20 L = 282.15 L = 282.15 L = 287.80
¯ R2 =0 .991 ¯ R2 =0 .992 ¯ R2 =0 .993 ¯ R2 =0 .994 ¯ R2 =0 .994 ¯ R2 =0 .994
nS =7 7 nS =6 6 nS =6 6 nS =6 7 nS =6 7 nS =7 9
nD =1 7 nD =2 6 nD =3 0 nD =3 0 nD =3 0 nD =1 6
FS = 82% FS =7 2 % FS = 69% FS = 69% FS = 69% FS = 83%
FD = 18% FD = 28% FD = 31% FD = 31% FD = 31% FD =1 7 %
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: (1) Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses, L: log-likelihood. (2) * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at 10% (5%) level.
(3) Bold characters are for variables which do not have the expected sign coeﬃcient. (4) nD (nS) denotes the number
of demand (supply) periods, and FD (FS) denotes the frequency of supply (demand) regimes given that a period or regime
occurs when the corresponding probability is higher than 0.5.
24Table 2: Credit to the Corporate Sector to GDP Ratio, 1989 - 1999
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
28.3 21.1 23 20.6 19.9 17.1 16.4 17.6 18.6 19.8 21.2
Source: National Bank of Poland and the authors’ calculations.
25Table 3: ML Estimates in Growth Rates, II/94 - II/02
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆Supply
Constant −11.69
(−1.25)
7.85
(0.37)
−1.54
(−0.09)
−6.29
(−0.32)
−6.29
(−0.32)
−30.77∗∗
(−2.46)
ILt −3.09
(−0.95)
0.72
(0.30)
1.74
(0.51)
ICt 1.92
(0.68)
−1.80
(−0.96)
−2.99
(−1.01)
−1.25
(−1.19)
ILt−1 7.10∗∗
(2.83)
ICt−1 −7.20∗∗
(−3.16)
(IL− IC)t 1.73
(0.51)
∆DEPt 1.63
(2.95)
∗∗ 2.12
(2.45)
∗∗ 1.74∗∗
(4.03)
1.94∗∗
(4.03)
1.94∗∗
(4.03)
1.37∗∗
(7.10)
∆ATBt −0.44∗∗
(−3.67)
−0.44∗∗
(−2.95)
−0.44∗∗
(−2.95)
−0.56∗∗
(−5.26)
∆LNFAt 0.31
(3.40)
∗∗ 0.31
(3.40)
∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(4.21)
σ1 10.62 10.42 7.57 7.05 7.05 5.87
∆Demand
Constant 37.13∗∗
(13.38)
40.55∗∗
(4.42)
38.97∗∗
(6.04)
33.56∗∗
(7.64)
33.56∗∗
(7.64)
49.87∗∗
(10.07)
ILt −1.32∗∗
(−2.64)
−1.40∗∗
(−4.96)
−1.40∗∗
(−4.41)
ICt 1.07
(1.52)
1.78
(4.06)
∗∗ 1.73∗∗
(4.16)
0.32
(1.27)
ILt−1 −1.38∗∗
(−4.24)
ICt−1 0.92∗∗
(2.07)
(IL− IC)t −1.40∗∗
(−4.41)
∆PRODt 0.34∗∗
(2.53)
0.04
(0.37)
−0.04
(−0.50)
−0.04
(−0.50)
0.07
(0.89)
∆SAVt −0.29∗∗
(−4.17)
−0.33∗∗
(−4.31)
−0.27∗∗
(−6.49)
−0.26∗∗
(−6.95)
−0.26∗∗
(−6.95)
−0.25∗∗
(−5.90)
∆OLt −2.97∗∗
(−7.45)
−1.77∗∗
(−5.45)
−1.77∗∗
(−5.45)
−2.46∗∗
(−6.75)
∆IMPt 0.27∗∗
(2.85)
0.27∗∗
(2.85)
0.31∗∗
(3.47)
σ2 5.71 4.33 2.72 3.05 3.05 2.74
L=−324.84 L=−308.10 L=−284.95 L=−272.04 L=−272.04 L=−261.72
¯ R2 =0 .41 ¯ R2 =0 .47 ¯ R2 =0 .63 ¯ R2 =0 .73 ¯ R2 =0 .73 ¯ R2 =0 .80
nS =3 1 nS =3 0 nS =5 3 nS =3 2 nS =3 2 nS =3 8
nD =6 1 nD =6 6 nD =4 3 nD =6 3 nD =6 3 nD =5 6
FS = 34% FS = 31% FS = 55% FS = 34% FS = 34% FS = 40%
FD = 66% FD =6 9 % FD =4 5 % FD = 66% FD = 66% FD = 60%
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: (1) Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses, L: log-likelihood. (2) * (**) denotes signiﬁcance at 10% (5%) level.
(3) Bold characters are for variables which do not have the expected sign coeﬃcient. (4) nD (nS) denotes the number
of demand (supply) periods, and FD (FS) denotes the frequency of supply (demand) regimes given that a period or regime
occurs when the corresponding probability is higher than 0.5.
26Table 4: Banking Indicators and Gross Oﬃcial Reserves, 1993 - 2001 (End-of-Year)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Gross proﬁt/income (in per cent) 6.0 6.0 16.9 19.4 14.7 7.1 6.2 4.6 2.6
Non-performing loans
(in per cent of total loan portfolio)
31.0 28.7 20.9 13.2 10.5 10.9 13.7 15.5 18.3
Gross oﬃcial reserves
(stock, USD billion)
4.3 6.0 15.0 18.0 20.7 28.3 27.3 27.5 26.6
Source: OECD (2000), IMF(2002), and National Bank of Poland.
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests: Variables in Level Forms,
II/94 - II/02
ADF Statistics PP Statistics
Variable Numb. UR with Joint Test: UR T-Statistic Numb. UR without UR UR
of Lags Const. and no Const. on the Const. of Lags Const. with Const. without Const.
IL 1 -1.93 4.33* - 1 -2.63** -1.89 -3.05**
IC 6 -1.41 1.56 - 1 -1.84** -0.39 -1.73*
CR 0 -2.37 24.38** - 23 . 1 1-2.22 5.40
PROD 8 -3.15** -3 . 2 2 ** 81 . 9 6 -2.93** 2.24
DEP 2 -5.34** -5 . 7 9 ** 17 . 2 2 -5.27** 9.58
SAV 0 -1.40 6.77** - 24 . 4 7-1.63 4.51
LNFA 0 -2.48 3.36 - 10 . 7 4-2.16 0.94
IMP 0- 2 . 6 7 * 5.41** - 01 . 7 7 -3.03** 2.11
OL 0 -1.48 1.71 - 01 . 0 8-1.48 1.10
ATB 0 -0.63 0.57 - 0 -0.91 -0.61 -0.94
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: (1) * (**) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% (5%) level. (2) The optimal lag number for ADF tests
was determined using the Schwarz criterion, and for PP tests acording to the Newey-West criterion, which pointed at 3 lags.
Table 6: Johansen Cointegration Tests Between the Amount of Credit and Exogenous
Variables, II/94 - II/02
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
H0 R =0 R =0 R =0 R =0 R =0 R =0
λtrace 2.09 1.30 18.15** 32.13** 32.13** 106.65**
Eigenvalue 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.85
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: (1) * (**) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% (5%) level. (2) Tests allow for an intercept
but no trend in the cointegrating relationship.
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